How can we be moral when we are so irrational?

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How can we be moral when we are so irrational?

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Publication Article, peer reviewed scientific
Title How can we be moral when we are so irrational?
Author(s) Brännmark, Johan ; Sahlin, Nils-Eric
Date 2013
English abstract
Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical findings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to bemeaningful to devise normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted more profitably if the idea of unifying all ethical concerns into one theoretical account is abandoned. Such a disunity of ethical theorizing would then match the disunited and heuristic-oriented nature of our agency. Some preliminary suggestions about what ethical theorizing might look like instead are provided here along with some remarks about how these relate to other approaches in the literature.
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Publisher National Centre for Logical Investigation, Belgium
Host/Issue Logique et Analyse;221
Volume 56
ISSN 0024-5836
Pages 101–126
Language eng (iso)
Subject(s) Ethics
Decision Theory
Humanities/Social Sciences
Research Subject Categories::HUMANITIES and RELIGION
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